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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
The relationship between governance and economic development is one of the 
most important areas of research in international development. Much of the 
previous literature has focused on whether better governance leads to higher 
levels of income. In this paper, we examine the relationship between governance 
and broader development outcomes, with a specific focus on developing Asia. In 
our empirical analysis, we use disaggregated measures of governance to capture 
different dimensions of governance, and to allow for the possibility that different 
dimensions of governance such as administrative capacity, legal infrastructure, 
and state accountability can affect development indicators differentially. We find 
a clear role for governance in affecting most development outcomes except 
levels of schooling. This is particularly evident for state administrative capacity 
and legal infrastructure, and less evident for state accountability. However, we 
find that the benign relationship between governance and development is weaker 
for Asian countries for several of the development indicators. We also find that 
the key mechanism by which governance affects development is by increasing 
the mobilization of domestic resources and by increasing the effectiveness with 
which these resources are spent on social sectors. Along with the fact that 
governance quality is lower in Asia than other regions of the world (except sub-
Saharan Africa), this suggests that improvements in governance along with the 
strengthening of the mechanisms by which governance affects social 
development can deliver clear gains in development outcomes in developing 
Asia. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: governance, development outcomes, Asia 
 
JEL Classification: I30, O11, O53 
  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The relationship between governance and economic development is one of the most important 
areas of research in international development (Grindle 2004). Governance can be defined as 
“the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social 
resources for development” (World Bank 1991). Development agencies have increasingly come 
to realize that good governance is not only a worthy goal in and of itself but also a means to 
impact on a variety of other outcomes, particularly economic growth and development 
(Gisselquist 2002). In poorly governed countries, high levels of corruption lead to evasion of 
taxes that could have been used to finance productive government investment and social 
expenditures for the poor. High levels of corruption also lead to the diversion of government 
funds that could have been used for service delivery to the poor (Rajkumar and Swaroop 2008). 
Low administrative capacity of the state along with weak accountability of service providers to 
citizens imply that government expenditures in health, education, and infrastructure are not 
spent effectively for poverty reduction and the achievement of broader development outcomes 
(World Bank 2004). As former United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted: “good 
governance is the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting 
development” (UNDP 2002). 
 
Surprisingly, given the importance of understanding the causal relationship between 
governance and broader development outcomes, much of the empirical literature has mostly 
focused on the narrower question of whether good governance leads to higher levels of income 
(Evans and Rauch 1999; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). In contrast, there is scant 
literature on the relationship between governance and broader development outcomes such as 
poverty and inequality, human development, years of schooling, gender inequality, infant and 
maternal mortality, and access to adequate sanitation (the exceptions are Rajkumar and 
Swaroop [2008] and Hallerod et al. [2013]). Whether better governance leads to broader 
development outcomes over and above improvements in living standards is particularly relevant 
in the context of developing Asia, where many countries have seen strong economic growth and 
an impressive expansion in public services in recent decades, but where there is wide variation 
in governmental performance with regard to service delivery and in broader development 
outcomes such as infant and maternal mortality, schooling, and access to sanitation (Asian 
Development Bank 2013). Furthermore, developing Asia has been characterized by weak and 
dysfunctional governance systems, relative to other regions of the world (Quibria 2013). 
 
First, we examine the causal relationship between governance and broad development 
outcomes and assess whether higher levels of governance leads to greater achievements in 
economic and social development. To capture economic and social development, we use a 
wide range of development indicators, such as headcount poverty, infant and maternal mortality, 
human development, literacy, gender inequality, access to sanitation, and quality of 
infrastructure provision. Second, we examine the relationship between governance quality and 
development outcomes with a focus on developing Asia, and assess whether the relationship is 
stronger or weaker for this region.  
 
How to conceptualize and measure governance has remained a matter of considerable 
debate (Fukuyama 2013). It is now widely understood that a single definition or measure does 
not adequately capture the different dimensions of governance (Langbein and Knack 2010). The 
literature on governance distinguishes between three key interrelated but conceptually separate 
dimensions of governance: (i) state administrative capacity—the quality of the bureaucracy and 
the ability of the bureaucracy to deliver services (Fukuyama 2013); (ii) legal infrastructure—the 
ability of the government to enforce laws and regulations (Besley and Persson 2011); and (iii) 
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accountability and state legitimacy—the extent to which the state is accountable for its own 
actions and the responsiveness of the state’s institutions to its citizens (UNDP 2011). In our 
empirical analysis, we unpack the concept of governance and use disaggregated measures of 
governance to capture different dimensions of governance. We do this to allow for the possibility 
that different dimensions of governance can affect development indicators differentially and that 
the use of a single measure of good governance may not be useful from a policy point of view to 
assess which dimension of governance may matter more in impacting one development 
indicator relative to others.  
 
From a theoretical standpoint, the relationship between governance and broader 
economic and social development is less well-understood than the relationship between 
governance and economic growth. Does better governance lead to improvements in child and 
maternal mortality and reductions in poverty through its direct effect of increasing levels income, 
particularly for lower income classes, and, by doing so, allowing poor households to invest more 
in schooling, nutrition, and health? Or does it occur through the better ability of the state to 
collect tax revenues to finance social expenditures? Or is the effect of better governance mostly 
through the higher effectiveness of public goods delivery to the poor? We explore these very 
different causal mechanisms between governance and development to better understand the 
specific pathways by which governance can affect development. We assess which of these 
mechanisms may be more important for the developing Asia context. 
 
 
 
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
How would improvements in governance quality affect social development? In this section, we 
sketch out a framework for understanding the causal links between governance and social 
development outcomes. The first mechanism by which governance can affect development (and 
the one most commonly studied in the literature) is by increasing the level of per capita 
incomes—and especially the incomes of the poor—allowing households to invest more of their 
incomes in health, nutrition and education. The relationship between governance and levels of 
income has been well studied in the literature (Hall and Jones 1999; Aron 2000; Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001; Glaeser et al. 2004; Rodrik, Subramanian, and Trebbi 2004). A 
better level of governance, such as improvements in legal infrastructure, provides firms with 
incentives to invest in productive activities such as the accumulation of capital and the 
development of new goods and production technologies. Better governance also provides 
incentives for households to spend more on health and education as they are encouraged by 
the possibility that they will be able to reap the benefits of these long-term investments. Better 
governance also implies that households need to divert less of their incomes to bribe corrupt 
government officials for essential services or to spend more on measures that protect their 
investments.  
 
The second mechanism by which governance affects development is by allowing the 
state to collect more tax revenue and, consequently, spend more on the social sector. Greater 
administrative capacity of the government allows for more efficiency in tax collection, while 
lower levels of corruption allow for lower leakages in tax revenues (Mookherjee 1998). The final 
mechanism by which better governance improves social development outcomes is by making 
social sector spending and public goods delivery more effective. Greater accountability of 
service providers to citizens and politicians ensures that, for example, education and health 
services reach the majority of the population, while lower corruption implies lower leakage of 
public funds to the nonpoor (World Bank 2004). Dawson (2010) finds evidence for 
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improvements in the rule of law reducing child mortality. Rakjumar and Swaroop (2008) find that 
lower corruption leads to more effectiveness in service delivery. Hallerod et al. (2013) find that 
greater quality of government has a strong positive effect on a wide range of measures of child 
poverty and nutrition.  
 
In Figure 1, we provide a summary of the three mechanisms by which governance 
affects development. Note that the mechanisms are not independent of each other. For 
example, a higher level of income will also imply higher tax revenues, if the elasticity of taxes to 
income is high. In general, we would expect the three mechanisms to work simultaneously, 
though the strength of these mechanisms may differ, both cross-nationally and by region.  
 
 
Figure 1: The Relationship between Governance and Development 
 
 
Source: Author’s conceptualization. 
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY, VARIABLES, AND DATA 
 
In this section, we first describe our measures of governance, present the empirical strategy, 
and then discuss the sources of data.  
 
A. Measuring Governance 
 
While there is a range of governance measures that are available cross-nationally, we use the 
World Governance Indicators (WGIs) from the World Bank as our key governance measures. 
The WGIs have three advantages for our purpose. First, the WGIs are themselves based on 
other governance indicators, and each submeasure in the WGIs is constructed using principal 
component analysis from a wide range of sources of secondary data on different dimensions of 
governance (see Kaufmann and Kraay 2008; Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). Second, 
unlike other measures of governance such as the quality of government (QoG) measure 
(Holmberg and Rothstein 2013) or the measure of bureaucratic quality and control of corruption 
from the International Risk Country Guide (ICRG), which have limited coverage for developing 
Asia, WGIs have data on 35 developing Asian economies. Finally, the WGIs provide 
disaggregated data on different dimensions of governance: state administrative capacity, legal 
infrastructure, and accountability. The five WGI measures that we use are (i) voice and 
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accountability (VOA), (ii) government effectiveness (GEE), (iii) regulatory quality (RQ),(iv) rule of 
law (RL), and (v) control of corruption (CC). The five aggregate indicators are based on 30 
underlying data sources reporting the perceptions of governance of a large number of survey 
respondents and expert assessments worldwide.1  Government effectiveness and control of 
corruption capture state administrative capacity, regulatory quality capture legal infrastructure, 
and rule of law and voice and accountability capture accountability and legitimacy of the state. 
Each measure ranges from –2.5 (weak governance) to +2.5 (strong governance). For all the 
indicators, a higher score indicates a better rating.  
 
Table 1 shows the averages by regions of the world for 2010 for the five indicators of the 
WGIs. Barring East Asia, other regions of Asia perform badly in governance quality relative to 
other developing country regions (though the Pacific does surprisingly well in voice and 
accountability). East Asia’s score in regulatory quality is the same as North America’s and 
Western Europe’s, though the region does not do so well in control of corruption and voice and 
accountability. We also observe wide variations in governance quality within Asia. In general, 
South Asia’s performance in governance quality is the worst in the region and comparable to 
sub-Saharan Africa. 
 
 
Table 1: Averages for Governance Indicators, by Region and Subregion of Asia, 2010 
 
Region 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Control of 
Corruption 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule 
of Law 
Voice and 
Accountability 
Number of 
Observations
Transition Economies –0.12 –0.13 0.33 0.05 0.27 20
Latin America –0.30 –0.29 –0.23 –0.57 –0.03 20
North Africa and Middle 
East 
0.01 –0.09 –0.04 –0.05 –0.86 20 
Sub-Saharan Africa –0.79 –0.61 –0.71 –0.74 –0.64 48
Advanced Economies 1.56 1.63 1.46 1.52 1.33 27
Central Asia –0.49 –0.88 –0.39 –0.77 –1.01 8 
East Asia 0.21 –0.04 1.46 1.52 –0.21 6 
South-east Asia –0.09 –0.37 –0.22 –0.09 –0.74 11
South Asia –0.51 –0.63 –0.73 –0.57 –0.47 8
The Pacific –0.66 –0.34 –0.86 0.08 0.55 12
The Caribbean 0.46 0.54 0.26 0.33 0.80 13 
Source: Worldwide Governance Indicators database, author’s calculations. 
 
 
B. Empirical Strategy 
 
Our key explanatory variables are the five measures of governance described above, and we 
would like to establish whether better governance as measured by the WGIs lead to better 
development outcomes. We are also interested in ascertaining whether the relationship 
between governance and development is different for Asian countries as compared to the rest 
of the world. 
  
                                                
1 Details on the underlying data sources, the aggregation method, and the interpretation of the indicators can be 
found in Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007). 
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We estimate regressions of the following form: 
 
Di = a1 + a2*Gi + a3*ASIAi + a4*ASIA*Gi + a5Zi + ei (1) 
 
where i stands for country; D is the development outcome for country i; G is the relevant WGI 
measure of governance quality; ASIA is a dummy variable, which takes the value 1 for all of 
developing Asia(0 otherwise); and Z is a vector of control variables.  
 
For D, we look at eight indicators that capture the range of economic and social 
development outcomes of interest to us. These are (i) headcount poverty(HCR) at $1.25 a day; 
(ii) under-5 mortality rate (U5M); (iii) maternal mortality rate (MMR); (iv) the United Nations 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI); (v) UNDP’s Gender 
Inequality Index (GII); (vi) years of schooling for children below 15 years (YOS);2 (vii) proportion 
of households with access to adequate sanitation(AAS); and (viii) a combined measure of the 
quality of ports, railroads, and electricity supply (INFS). 3  Depending on the development 
indicator, we expect a2 to be positive or negative and statistically significant (for HCR, U5M, 
MMR, and GII, we expect a2 to be negative; and for HDI, YOS, AAS, and INFS, we expect a2 to 
be positive). We are interested in assessing the sign and significance of the interaction term, 
ASIA*G—if a2 is negative and significant, a negative and significant coefficient for a4 suggests 
that the relationship between governance and development is stronger in Asia, while a positive 
and significant relationship suggests a weaker (or even perverse) relationship. Conversely, if a2 
is positive and significant, a negative and significant coefficient suggests that the relationship 
between governance and development is weaker in Asia, while a positive and significant 
relationship suggests that the relationship is stronger. 
 
We use three variables as controls: the ratio of net development assistance to gross 
domestic product (GDP), the share of urban population (URBAN), and the number of 
developmental civil society organizations (CSOs) as a ratio of the population. We would expect 
that higher aid flows to developing countries will enable them to use some or all these aid flows 
for social sector spending; hence, countries with higher aid flows are expected to do better in 
development outcomes (though donor countries may also target countries with poor 
development performance for assistance). The literature on public service delivery suggests that 
it is easier to target more urbanized populations, so that the relationship between urbanization 
and development outcomes is expected to be positive. A greater presence of developmental 
CSOs in a particular country may allow for greater provision of services by the non-state sector 
to the poor. 
 
We estimate equation (1) by ordinary least squares, using cross-sectional data (with 
HCR, U5M, MMR, HDR, GII, YOS, AAS, INFS, AID, and URBAN in logs). Similar to the 
methodology followed by Hall and Jones (1999) and other studies that examine the long-term 
effect of institutions on levels of income using cross-sectional regression methods, we are 
interested in examining the long-run effects of governance on broader developmental outcomes 
such as success in reducing poverty, inequality, and malnutrition, which are long-term 
                                                
2 Average schooling years in total population aged 15 years or less, obtained from Barro and Lee (2000), and as 
reported in the World Development Indicators of the World Bank. 
3 The World Development Indicators report the quality of port and railroad infrastructure and quality of electricity 
supply from a range of 1 to 7 for each measure, where 1 = extremely underdeveloped and 7 = efficient by 
international standards. These data are obtained from the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report.  
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phenomena.4 However, to allow for the possibility of reverse causality from the development 
outcomes to governance (say, greater levels of human development that foster positive 
changes to governance quality, with a more literate population demanding greater accountability 
and transparency in government), we also use instrumental variable two-stage least squares 
regressions, where we instrument governance quality with standard variables that are 
conventionally used in the literature as instruments—the settler mortality rate (Acemoglu, 
Johnson, and Robinson 2001), latitude of the country, and colonial origin of the country’s legal 
system. The first has been extensively used in the growth institutions literature: The settler 
mortality rate is an indirect measure of the disease environment in the colonies and thus 
measures the likelihood of Europeans settling in a particular colony and setting up institutions of 
private property. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) find that there is a high correlation 
between the mortality rates faced by soldiers, bishops, and sailors in the colonies and European 
settlements and early measures of institutions, as well as between early institutions and current 
institutions. They show that he settler mortality rate is not able to explain current development 
outcomes directly and thus meets the exclusion restriction for a valid instrument. Geographical 
variables such as latitude has been used extensively as instruments for institutions and 
governance—the farther one is from the equator, the less likely it is that countries adopted 
Western-style institutions (Hall and Jones 1999). Finally, we use the colonial origin of the legal 
system of the country. As La Porta et al. (1999) have shown, greater institutional quality is 
associated with countries with English common law systems as compared to French civil law 
systems. We also experiment with two alternate measures of governance: the government 
impartiality measure (QOG) developed by the Quality of Government Institute, which scores the 
public administration of countries based on their impartiality, viewed by Holmberg and Rothstein 
(2013) to be a measure of good governance; and the ICRG measure of the quality of 
government (INST), which is the mean value of the ICRG variables corruption, law and order, 
and bureaucratic quality, and which is based on perceptions of experts on these governance 
indicators for 139 countries.  
 
A common criticism of cross-sectional methods is that they are not able to address 
unobserved time-invariant country attributes that may drive certain variables such as, in our 
case, development outcomes and governance quality. For example, a more homogenous or 
less fractionalized population in a particular country may imply that public goods provision may 
be more likely in that country and will be correlated with better governance if elites share a 
common vision and are less polarized (Alesina and Zhuravskaya 2011; Alesina, Baquir, and 
Easterly 1999; Alesina et al. 2003). As the WGIs are not appropriate for use in a panel data 
format (Quibria 2013), we use two measures from the ICRG bureaucratic quality (BQ) and 
control of corruption (CCTS)—data for which are available from 1984onward for a limited 
number of countries (15 of them being in Asia).  
 
Data. The data are obtained from the University of Gothenburg’s Quality of Government 
(QoG) Institute, which provides cross-sectional data on a variety of governance and 
development variables5; compiling data from secondary sources. The development indicators 
are obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI)6 for 2010 or the 
nearest year for which data are available. With respect to the control variables, aid as a ratio of 
GDP (AID)and share of urban population in total population (URBAN) are obtained from the 
                                                
4 In addition, WGIs are not appropriate to be used in panel format as the sources of WGI data have changed over 
time (Quibria 2013), and several of the development indicators we use on the left hand side are available 
infrequently for many low-income countries. 
5  See version of May 2013 at http://ww.qog.pol.gu.se/data/ 
6 See http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
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WDI, while developmental CSOs as a ratio of GDP is obtained from Grimes (2008), who 
provides data on the number of CSOs active in the area of social and economic development 
(as in the QOG data). The WGIs are for 2010 and are obtained from the WGI database.7 The 
other governance variables, QOG, and INST, are obtained from the QoG dataset for 2010, while 
the time-series data on BQ and CCTS are obtained from ICRG for 1984–2010. 
 
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
We begin our empirical analysis by looking at the averages of the eight development indicators 
by region in Table 2. We observe that Asia scores badly in most of these indicators than other 
regions, except for sub-Saharan Africa. The only exception is the quality of infrastructure, where 
Asia does better than Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Middle East and North Africa. 
In gender inequality, Asia does not score significantly worse than these regions. Within Asia, we 
also see wide variation in development outcomes, with Central and East Asia doing better than 
South Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific in most outcomes (Table 3).Central Asia does 
better than East Asia in lower headcount poverty, lower maternal mortality, and greater access 
to adequate sanitation. 
 
Main Results: We present the results for state administrative capacity and legal 
infrastructure—government effectiveness, control of corruption, and regulatory quality—in 
Table 4 and the results for state accountability and legitimacy—voice and accountability and 
rule of law—in Table 5. 
 
 
Table 2: Averages for Development Indicators, by Region 
 
Region 
Transitional 
Economies 
Latin American 
and Caribbean 
Middle East and 
North Africa 
Advanced 
Economies 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Asia 
Head Count Poverty, $1.25 a 
day (per cent) 
0.52 6.75 1.43 N/A 47.60 15.1 
Under Five Mortality Rate 11.8 21.9 20.4 4.3 104.6 34.2 
Maternal Mortality Rate 17.9 84.0 54.3 7.5 580.1 181.8 
Human Development Index 
(between 0 and 1) 
0.77 0.71 0.72 0.88 0.44 0.64
Gender Inequality Index 
(between 0 and 1) 
0.23 0.44 0.41 0.14 0.59 0.40
Access to Adequate Sanitation 92.1 80.4 90.9 99.9 34.4 72.0 
Quality of Infrastructure 
(between 3 and 21) 
10.5 9.3 11.2 15.9 9.4 11.6 
Years of Schooling 10.6 8.4 7.6 10.8 5.4 7.8 
Source: Author’s calculations from World Bank (2013). The year of the observations is 2010 or the nearest year for which data are 
available. 
 
  
                                                
7  See http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/  
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Table 3: Averages for Development Indicators, by Subregion, Developing Asia 
 
 HCR HDI GII U5M MMR AAS YOS INFS
Central Asia  5.0 0.67 0.35 41.0  41.1 93.6 9.7 11.2 
South Asia 19.0 0.47 0.46 48.2 362.9 50.3 5.4 10.0 
East Asia 13.1 0.77 0.20 15.0  57.8 78.8 9.8 10.1 
Southeast Asia 18.8 0.63 0.39 30.9 206.5 70.5 7.1 11.7 
Pacific N.A. 0.62 0.67 30.3 186.5 65.9 6.8 10.5 
Notes: HCR: headcount ratio, $1.25 a day; HDI: UNDP’s Human Development Index; GII: UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index; U5M: 
Under-5 mortality rate, MMR: Maternal mortality rate; AAS: Proportion of households with access to adequate sanitation; YOS: 
Years of schooling for population under 15; INFS: Combined measure of the quality of port and railroad infrastructure, and reliability 
of electricity supply.  
HCR and AAS are in percentages; HDI and GII are between 0 and 1 (higher values of HDI imply higher human development, higher 
values of GII imply lower gender inequality); U5M and MMR are per 1,000; YOS is average years of schooling; INFS is a value 
which ranges from 3 to 21. 
Source: World Bank (2013). 
 
 
Table 4: Regression Results, Administrative Capacity and Legal Infrastructure 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 HCR HDI GII U5M MMR AAS YOS INFS
GE –0.77* 
(0.099) 
0.16*** 
(0.000) 
–0.22*** 
(0.000) 
–0.59*** 
(0.000) 
–0.72*** 
(0.000) 
0.26*** 
(0.003) 
0.16** 
(0.015) 
0.17*** 
(0.001) 
Asia 0.18 
(0.772) 
0.07 
(0.115) 
–0.14* 
(0.082) 
–0.19 
(0.280) 
–0.21 
(0.461) 
0.14 
(0.323) 
0.17 
(0.107) 
0.09 
(0.160) 
GE*Asia 1.08 
(0.24) 
–0.15** 
(0.008) 
0.05 
(0.605) 
0.30 
(0.186) 
0.59* 
(0.094) 
–0.40** 
(0.033) 
–0.08 
(0.543) 
0.156 
(0.117) 
R-square 0.38 0.73 0.33 0.57 0.53 0.50 0.47 0.37 
CC –0.49 
(1.08) 
0.11*** 
(0.000) 
–0.16** 
(0.006) 
–0.54*** 
(0.000) 
–0.54*** 
(0.003) 
0.18** 
(0.043) 
0.10** 
(0.044) 
0.11** 
(0.045) 
Asia 0.09 
(0.909) 
0.13* 
(0.098) 
0.18* 
(0.100) 
–0.40* 
(0.050) 
–0.37 
(0.326) 
0.18 
(0.367) 
0.10 
(0.381) 
0.26** 
(0.036) 
CC*Asia 0.80 
(0.408) 
–0.08 
(0.274) 
0.05 
(0.713) 
0.04 
(0.150) 
0.40 
(0.344) 
–0.28 
(0.193) 
–0.19 
(0.123) 
0.24 
(0.122) 
R-square 0.30 0.70 0.26 0.56 0.49 0.47 0.46 0.28 
RQ –0.75* 
(0.066) 
0.13*** 
(0.000) 
–0.15*** 
(0..002) 
–0.42*** 
(0.000) 
–0.69*** 
(0.000) 
0.20** 
(0.010) 
0.08 
(0.165) 
0.09** 
(0.044) 
Asia –0.06 
(0.919) 
0.11** 
(0.018) 
–0.20** 
(0.019) 
–0.36* 
(0.065) 
–0.32 
(0.255) 
0.21 
(0.162) 
0.23** 
(0.043) 
0.12* 
(0.080) 
RQ*Asia 0.79 
(0.416) 
–0.09 
(0.119) 
0.03 
(0.766) 
0.09 
(0.695) 
0.47 
(0.171) 
–0.27 
(0.141) 
0.02 
(0.884) 
0.26* 
(0.055) 
R-square 0.32 0.71 0.28 0.53 0.53 0.49 0.45 0.29 
Number of Observations 69 119 99 119 119 116 93 80 
Notes: HCR: headcount ratio, $1.25 a day; HDI: UNDP’s Human Development Index; GII: UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index; U5M: 
Under-5 mortality rate, MMR: Maternal mortality rate; AAS: Proportion of households with access to adequate sanitation; YOS: 
Years of schooling for population under 15; INFS: Combined measure of the quality of port and railroad infrastructure, and reliability 
of electricity supply.  
GE: Government effectiveness; CC: Control of corruption; RQ: Regulatory quality. 
Control variables: log (Net Development Assistance/GDP); log (Urban Population share of total population), and log (Developmental 
civil society organizations per capita), p-values in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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Table 5: Regression Results, State Accountability and Legitimacy 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
 HCR HDI GII U5M MMR AAS YOS INFS
VA –0.15 
(0.707) 
0.11*** 
(0.000) 
–0.11** 
(0.012) 
–0.31*** 
(0.000) 
–0.44*** 
(0.000) 
0.07 
(0.327) 
0.08 
(0.218) 
0.04 
(0.394) 
Asia 0.34 
(0.639) 
0.09* 
(0.058) 
–0.18* 
(0.102) 
–0.40* 
(0.050) 
–0.05 
(0.867) 
0.15 
(0.346) 
0.27 
(0.128) 
0.04 
(0.647) 
VA*Asia 0.98 
(0.209) 
–0.11** 
(0.025) 
0.31*** 
(0.002) 
0.05 
(0.794) 
0.79*** 
(0.009) 
–0.28* 
(0.086) 
0.05 
(0.812) 
–0.05 
(0.618) 
R-square 0.30 0.70 0.28 0.51 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.19 
RL –0.94** 
(0.024) 
0.13*** 
(0.000) 
–0.17*** 
(0.002) 
–0.51*** 
(0.000) 
–0.62*** 
(0.000) 
0.23*** 
(0.009) 
0.17 
(0.253) 
0.13*** 
(0.009) 
Asia 0.57 
(0.721) 
0.089 
(0.111) 
–0.16* 
(0.099) 
–0.36 
(0.106) 
 
–0.19 
(0.572) 
0.10 
(0.576) 
0.19 
(0.118) 
0.17** 
(0.045) 
RL*Asia 1.49 
(0.140) 
–0.11* 
(0.092) 
 
0.04 
(0.390) 
0.08 
(0.756) 
0.58 
(0.139) 
–0.40** 
(0.049) 
–0.04 
(0.808) 
0.20* 
(0.085) 
R-square 0.40 0.70 0.28 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.45 0.33 
Number of Observations 69 119 99 119 119 116 93 80 
Notes: HCR: Head Count Ratio, $1.25 a day; HDI: UNDP’s Human Development Index; GII: UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index;  
U5M: Under 5 years Mortality Rate, MMR: Maternal Mortality Rate; AAS: Proportion of households with access to adequate 
sanitation; YOS: Years of schooling for Population Under 15 years; INFS: Combined measure of the quality of port and railroad 
infrastructure, and reliability of electricity supply.  
VA: Voice and Accountability, RL: Rule of Law. 
Control variables: log (Net Development Assistance/GDP); log (Urban Population share of Total Population, and log Developmental 
CSOs per capita; p-values in parentheses. 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
We first discuss Table 4. We find that improvements in government effectiveness and 
regulatory quality are associated with lower headcount poverty, but not improvements in control 
of corruption (column (1)). The interaction terms GQ*ASIA are not significant for GE, CC, and 
RQ, suggesting that the relationship between governance and poverty for Asia is no different 
than for the rest of the world. In the case of the Human Development Index, under-5 mortality 
rate, and the Gender Inequality Index, all three measures of governance—government 
effectiveness, control of corruption, and regulatory quality—are associated with better 
outcomes, with the coefficients on the governance variables of the right sign and significant 
(columns (2)–(4)). However, for government effectiveness, the relationship for Asia is weaker 
than for the rest of the world, as the coefficients on the interaction terms are negative and 
positive for HDI and U5M respectively. With respect to maternal mortality, access to adequate 
sanitation, years of schooling and quality of infrastructure, all three governance measures have 
a positive impact on these outcomes, except in the case of years of schooling, where regulatory 
quality has no discernible effect (columns (5)–(8)). The relationship between governance and 
the development outcome in question is weaker for developing Asia for government 
effectiveness in the case of maternal mortality and access to sanitation. However, the 
relationship is stronger for regulatory quality with respect to quality of infrastructure for these 
economies. 
 
We now consider the effects of state accountability on development outcomes. The 
results are presented in Table 5. We see that voice and accountability has no discernible 
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negative effect on poverty, but that rule of law does (column (1)). We find that both voice and 
accountability and rule of law have the expected effects on human development, gender 
inequality, and under-5 mortality—the coefficients are of the right signs and are statistically 
significant (columns (2)–(4)). However, the relationship between governance and human 
development is weaker for developing Asia for both voice and accountability and the rule of law 
and in the case of gender inequality for voice and accountability. In fact, for human development 
and gender inequality, the magnitude of the interaction term swamps the direct effect of voice 
and accountability, suggesting that there is a perverse negative relationship between human 
development and gender equality on the one hand and voice and accountability on the other in 
the case of developing Asia. With respect to maternal mortality and access to adequate 
sanitation, both governance measures have a positive impact on these outcomes, though the 
relationship between both governance measures and access to sanitation is weaker in the case 
of developing Asia (columns (5) and (6)). In the case of years of schooling, we see no 
discernible effect of these two governance measures (column (7)). In the case of quality of 
infrastructure, voice and accountability has no effect, though regulatory quality has a positive 
effect and, in the case of the latter, the relationship is stronger for developing Asia. 
 
Why do we see a weaker relationship between government effectiveness and voice and 
accountability on the one hand and several of the development indicators for Asia as compared 
to the rest of the world? To answer this question, consider Tables 1 and 3 again. In developing 
Asia, East Asia has a particularly low score in voice and accountability and Central Asia in 
government effectiveness and the rule of law. However, both these subregions have done well 
in several of the development indicators such as a high Human Development Index, reduction in 
maternal mortality, and high access to adequate sanitation. These two subregions of Asia have 
done better in development than may be predicted by their governance quality (voice and 
accountability in the case of East Asia and government effectiveness and the rule of law in the 
case of Central Asia). This implies that the strong relationship between low governance and low 
development that we observe in the rest of the world is not so evident in the Asian region. 
 
 
Table 6: Summary of Main Results 
 
 HCR HDI GII U5M MMR AAS YOS INFS 
Does better 
governance quality 
lead to improvements 
in the development 
indicator? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes, but not 
VA. 
Yes, but 
only for GE 
and CC 
Yes, but not 
for VA. 
Is the relationship 
stronger or weaker for 
Asia, or the same? 
Same Weaker, for GE, 
VA and RL, 
Negative for all 
three. 
Weaker, for VA 
(negative 
relationship) 
Same Weaker,  
for GE and VA 
(negative 
relationship) 
Weaker, for 
GE, and RL. 
For VA, the 
effect is 
negative. 
Same Stronger for 
RQ and RL, 
the same 
for others 
Notes: Yes, when the coefficient on the governance is of the right sign and statistically significant at 10% or less. Same, when the 
coefficient of the interaction term of the Governance measure with the Asia dummy is statistically not significant at 10% or less; 
Weaker/Stronger, when the coefficient of the interaction term of the governance measure with the Asia dummy is statistically 
significant at 10% or less.  
HCR: Head Count Ratio, $1.25 a day; HDI: UNDP’s Human Development Index; GII: UNDP’s Gender Inequality Index; U5M: Under 
5 years Mortality Rate, MMR: Maternal Mortality Rate; AAS: Proportion of households with access to adequate sanitation; YOS: 
Years of schooling for Population Under 15 years; INFS: Combined measure of the quality of port and railroad infrastructure, and 
reliability of electricity supply.  
GE: Government Effectiveness, CC: Control of Corruption and RQ: Regulatory Quality; VA: Voice and Accountability, RL: Rule of 
Law.  
Source: Author’s estimates. 
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In Table 6, we summarize our main findings. The relationship between better 
governance and better development outcomes generally holds true for all development 
outcomes, except years of schooling. However, the effect of greater voice and accountability on 
better development outcomes is not evident from our results across all development indicators. 
We also find that, in general, the relationship between governance and development is weaker 
for developing Asia, except in the case of quality of infrastructure, where the relationship is 
stronger.  
 
A. Alternate Specifications and Robustness Tests 
 
While our main results show a clear positive relationship between governance quality and 
development indicators for most governance measures and development indicators, given the 
criticisms of the WGI indicators (Quibria 2013), we confirm whether our results are robust to 
alternate measures of governance quality—the measure of government impartiality developed 
by the Quality of Government Institute and ICRG’s measure of governance. We present the 
results in columns (1) and (2) of Table 7 (with HDI and control of corruption as our key left- and 
right-hand side variables).8 We see that the positive effect of governance quality on human 
development is still evident with these new measures of governance. Further, we present 
instrumental variable estimates of equation (1), using the settler mortality rate, the legal origin of 
the country, and the latitude of the country as instruments for our governance measure (we use 
regulatory quality as our measure of governance in this case) in column (3). The coefficient on 
GQ remains positive and statistically significant (the p-value of Hansen’s J statistic shows that 
the instruments are valid). Finally, we use a panel dataset with time-varying measures of 
governance quality available from ICRG to address unobserved time-invariant country attributes 
that may explain both high levels of governance and higher attainment of social development 
(for example, cultural factors). We look at two alternate time-series measures of governance 
available from ICRG—bureaucratic quality and control of corruption. We calculate estimates of 
equation (1) (without the dummy variable for Asia which is time-invariant and its interaction with 
GQ) with country-fixed effects, and present the results in columns (4) and (5). We find that the 
coefficients on bureaucratic quality and control of corruption are of the right sign and significant. 
Thus, there is strong evidence that the relationship between governance quality and social 
development outcomes is robust to a variety of alternate specifications, measures of 
governance, and estimators. 
 
  
                                                
8 The results are the same with different combinations of our development indicators on the left-hand side and WGI 
governance measures on the right-hand side. 
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Table 7: Further Results and Robustness Tests 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
 Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
GQ – – 0.37** 
(0.041) 
– – 
GQ*Asia – – 0.39 
(0.335) 
– – 
Asia 0.18** 
(0.018) 
0.67** 
(0.010) 
0.10 
(0.409) 
– – 
QoG 0.08** 
(0.044) 
– – – – 
QoG*Asia 0.08 
(0.367) 
– – – – 
ICRG  0.66*** 
(0.000) 
– – – 
ICRG*Asia  –1.18** 
(0.024) 
– – – 
Control of Corruption – – – – 0.014* 
(0.053) 
Bureaucratic Quality – – – 0.026** 
(0.010) 
– 
Method of Estimation OLS OLS IV Panel, Country 
Fixed Effects 
Panel, Country 
Fixed Effects 
R-square 0.68 0.61 0.41 0.39 0.35 
Number of Observations 65 87 54 244 244 
Notes: GQ is control of corruption in columns (1) to (3) and government effectiveness in column (4). 
Control variables: log (Net Development Assistance/GDP); log (Urban Population share of Total Population, and log Developmental 
CSOs per capita for columns  (1) to (4), and : log (Net Development Assistance/GDP), and Inflation Rate; p-values in parentheses. 
 ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
B. Testing for Causal Mechanisms 
 
In Section II, we discussed three mechanisms by which governance could affect social 
development. First, by increasing the level of income, and allowing households to spend more 
on education and health, better governance could have an income effect on social development. 
Second, by increasing tax revenue as a ratio of GDP, better governance may allow for greater 
resources to be mobilized for social sector spending. Last, better governance may allow for 
greater effectiveness of social sector spending and will therefore allow for greater effectiveness 
of service delivery for the poor. We test for these three mechanisms explicitly in this subsection, 
presenting the results in Table 8. First, we examine the validity of these mechanisms for all the 
regions of the world, and then test for the mechanisms specifically for Asia. We begin with 
testing for the “income effect”—we include per capita income in the specification set out in 
equation (1). If the income effect is valid, we would expect the coefficient on per capita to be 
positive and significant, and the coefficient on GQ to be insignificant. We find that the coefficient 
on per capita income is positive and significant, and the coefficient on GQ (we use CC as our 
preferred governance measure) remains positive and significant (column (1)). This suggests 
that while the “income effect” is important, the other mechanisms are important as well. Testing 
for the “income effect” specifically for Asia, we find that the interaction term of income with the 
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Asia dummy is not significant, suggesting that this mechanism works in the same way for Asia 
as it does for the rest of the world (column (2)).  
 
 
Table 8: Testing for Causal Mechanisms 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
CC 0.05** 
(0.036) 
0.04** 
(0.-41) 
0.02 
(0.625) 
0.03 
(0.512) 
0.05 
(0.167) 
0.05 
(0.165) 
CC*Asia –0.08 
(0.106) 
–0.07 
(0.205) 
–0.002 
(0.979) 
–0.02 
(0.783) 
–0.14* 
(0.059) 
–0.13 
(0.116) 
Asia 0.08* 
(0.072) 
–0.31 
(0.346) 
0.14** 
(0.032) 
–0.21 
(0.523) 
0.13** 
(0.026) 
0.27 
(0.109) 
Per Capita Income 0.21*** 
(0.000) 
0.21*** 
(0.000) 
– – – – 
Per Capita Income*Asia – –0.02 
(0.481) 
– – – – 
Tax Revenue – – 0.08*** 
(0.001) 
0.08*** 
(0.003) 
– – 
Tax Revenue*Asia – – – 0.13 
(0.283) 
– – 
Public Expenditure on 
Health 
– – –  0.12*** 
(0.000) 
0.12 
(0.002) 
Public Expenditure on 
Health*Asia 
– – –  – –0.03 
(0.683) 
Public Expenditure on 
Education 
– – –  0.002 
(0.946) 
0.03 
(0.514) 
Public Expenditure on 
Education*Asia 
– – –  – –0.11 
(0.683) 
Method of Estimation OLS OLS OLS  OLS OLS 
R-square 0.85 0.87 0.37 0.41 0.79 0.79 
Number of Observations 116 116 49 49 69 69 
Notes: CC: Control of Corruption; Control variables: log (Net Development Assistance/GDP); log (Urban Population share of Total 
Population, and log Developmental CSOs per capita; Tax Revenue and Public Health Expenditure as ratio of GDP, and Public 
Expenditure Education per capita; p-values in parentheses; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent respectively. 
Source: Author’s estimates. 
 
 
Testing for the effect of governance on tax revenue mobilization (by including tax 
revenue), we see that the coefficient on tax revenue is positive and significant, but that the 
coefficient on GQ is not significant (column (3)). This suggests that the tax revenue mechanism 
is particularly strong, and this may be a key mechanism by which governance affects 
development. Next, we look at the social sector spending mechanism by including public 
expenditures on health and education. We see that the coefficient on public health spending is 
positive and significant, but that the coefficient on public education spending is not. Interestingly, 
the coefficient on GQ is not significant. This suggests that the social spending mechanism is 
also important for how governance affects development outcomes (column (5)). We do not see 
any difference in the way these two mechanisms operate for developing Asia as compared to 
the rest of the world, as evident by the lack of significance of the interaction terms of tax and 
social expenditures with the Asia dummy (columns (4) and (6)). Overall, our results suggest that 
governance has affected social development mostly by leading to greater mobilization of 
resources and the effectiveness of spending of these resources for health, with the “income 
effect” of governance on social development being less important. 
 
14   І   ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 384 
V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
In this paper, we study the relationship between governance quality and development outcomes 
with a focus on developing Asia. We look at a range of development indicators: headcount 
poverty, human development, gender inequality, infant and maternal mortality, literacy, provision 
of sanitation, and quality of infrastructure. In our empirical analysis, we use disaggregated 
measures of governance to capture different dimensions of governance, and to allow for the 
possibility that different dimensions of governance such as administrative capacity, legal 
infrastructure, and state accountability can affect development indicators differentially. We 
explore the causal mechanisms by which governance can affect development, and conduct a 
range of robustness tests to assess whether governance is causally related to better social 
development.  
 
Our econometric analysis shows a clear role for governance in affecting most 
development outcomes except schooling levels. This is particularly evident for administrative 
capacity and legal infrastructure, and less evident for voice and accountability. However, we find 
that the benign relationship between governance and development is weaker for Asia for 
several of the development indicators. We also find that the key mechanisms by which 
governance affects development is increasing the mobilization of domestic resources as well as 
increasing the effectiveness by which these resources are spent on social sectors. Along with 
the fact that governance quality is lower in Asia than in other regions of the world (except sub-
Saharan Africa), this suggests that improvements in governance along with the strengthening of 
the mechanisms by which governance affects social development can deliver clear gains in 
social development in developing Asia.  
 
Our findings have three clear policy implications. Firstly, measures that improve 
governance systems around state administrative capacity and state legitimacy – such as 
improvements in the quality of the bureaucracy that lead to better public implementation 
capacity and stronger anti-corruption initiatives that lead to lower leakages in public goods 
provision – can lead to gains in social development, such as lower infant and maternal mortality, 
and reductions in income poverty. Secondly, give that governance quality is lower in Asia than 
other regions of the world (except Sub-Saharan Africa) and that the mechanisms linking 
governance and development are weaker in developing Asia, our findings suggest that 
improvements in governance along with the strengthening of the mechanisms by which 
governance affects social development can deliver particularly strong gains in social 
development in developing Asia. Finally, our results suggest that while improvements in voice 
and accountability have an intrinsic value of their own, they have less of a role to play in 
affecting development outcomes as compared to state administrative capacity and legal 
infrastructure. For policy-makers in countries with weak governance environments who face 
choices on which dimension of governance to act on, the highest payoffs in terms of gains in 
social development may be in targeting improvements in the functioning of the bureaucracy and 
in the quality of regulatory and ‘rule of law’ institutions.  
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